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THE PUBLIC COMPANY IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
(Gustavo Visentini *) 
 
 
Introduction. I. The differing company models in national 
legal systems.  1. Two models  2. The structure of the financial 
system shapes the company model.  II Traditional principles of 
company law.  3. The company as a means of collecting savings 
from the general public  4. The techniques of the company.  5. The 
issues that arise in the collection of diffuse savings.  6. Crises have 
prompted the legislators to identify solutions.  6.1 The English 
laws of 1855-56 (Company Act).  6.2 The US securities legislation 
of the thirties.  7. The principles of the publicly held company.  III 
The Company as the legal structure for large businesses: the 
Italian experience.  8. The structure of the financial system 
shapes the company.  9. The company as a device for the 
organisation of the business.  10.  European Integration. 
 
 
In periods of fast-moving change it is useful to reconsider the 
fundamental principles of legal institutions. These principles are the concepts 
from which the law is developed.  They come from tradition and experience, 
we can identify them through history and through a comparative approach.  
These principles are the necessary starting point, whilst following the evolution 
of the law, in order to understand and decide on any reforms. 
For the legislator the principles are the policy reasons behind the 
reform, entrusted to the interpreter (the Court) for the application of the law 
(ratio legis).  Academia examines and discusses the principles to assist in the 
drafting of the law and to maintain its quality.  It is from such a perspective 
that I will examine and discuss the principles of the public company. 
                                                   
* Working Group: Eugenio Ruggiero, Eugenio S. De Nardis. 
This paper is a follow-up to the company law research project that resulted in the 
publication of Arthur R. PINTO and Gustavo VISENTINI, The Legal basis of corporate 
governance in publicly held corporations – A comparative approach, Kluwer International, 
London 1998, and intends to be the basis and guideline for a new research project. 
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I 
The differing company models in national legal systems 
1. Two models. 
 The company is an institution that the law has adapted in order to 
fulfil the specific functions it has been called on to carry out in different 
situations.  Company principles can be grouped into two models: a) the 
company as a device for the collection of savings from the public in order to 
finance investments; b) the company as a device for the organisation of large 
businesses. 
The first model reflects the real purpose of the company and has seen a 
noticeable development in the USA.  The second model is the product of the 
characteristics of early industrialisation in the Germanic countries, widely used 
in post-war European economies.  I will examine this second model from the 
Italian perspective. 
This analysis proves necessary as the integration of European 
economies, as well as competition with the USA, have led to major changes in 
company law. Indeed there is a tendency towards a predominant model, which 
leaves behind national characteristics and addresses problems which are 
increasingly common. 
Changes affect the national conception of the company, its use, its 
ownership structure and they are reflected in the corporate governance.  That is 
why changes cause social and political tensions.  The alleged neutrality of the 
company as a legal device (i.e. the idea that a company can be used for different 
purposes, both profit or non-profit) is merely a superficial façade that some 
authors put forward in the Sixties. 
 
2. The structure of the financial system shapes the company model.  
Which of the two models prevails depends upon the structure of the 
financial system. 
If the system regulates the financing of businesses through the 
intermediation of banks and with the investment of major shareholders (and in 
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some instances state funds), without obliging to resort to the securities market, 
the purpose of the company (to collect diffuse savings) withers and the 
institution is mainly used to organise the management of the business. 
Differently, in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, in the USA, the need for 
companies to resort to the securities market for financing has preserved the 
original function of the company as a device for the collection of public 
savings.  Public market financing competes with bank financing: the company 
has thus preserved its original function of organising collected capital.  The 
duration in time of such a function has meant that the stock market has had to 
develop, in especially sophisticated ways, regulations pursuing investor-
protection in order to ensure the flow of finance from the public. 
It is commonly said that the American system is market-driven, while the 
continental European systems are bank-dependent and, in mixed economies such 
as Italy, they are state-directed.1 
Under American law the company has maintained its function of 
organising capital collected from the public.  Investors are protected through 
consumer protection techniques.  Whereas, in continental law, the presence of 
major shareholders who are able to efficiently monitor their investments 
reduces the function of the company to a business organisation device, thus 
creating the conditions to include into the business organisation values and 
components other than those related to capital protection (as it occurred with 
regard to employees’ interests or government or State holdings). 
European integration and integration into the global economy impose 
the development of financial markets and thus the development and 
strengthening of the model of the company allowing direct access to them.  In 
the globalised economy, there seems to be a convergence towards the publicly-
held company model, along the lines of the US model.  We will therefore look 
at this model first. 
                                                   
1 Jonathan STORY, The Frontiers of Fortune, Financial Times, London 1999 
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II 
Traditional principles of company law 
 
3.  The company as a means of collecting savings from the general 
public.  
The company is an institution of market economies which allows 
investment in intensive capital businesses through the collection of savings 
from the public.  Its function is specifically the organisation of collected capital for 
investment in business. 
The first examples of companies date back to the second half of the 
XVIII century when the industrialisation of economies (England and France) 
required the concentration of capital in amounts that single entrepreneurs and 
banks were no longer able to supply. 
The company was organised through certain techniques that have 
allowed it to fulfil its function.  These techniques have themselves given rise to 
issues that are new when compared to traditional mercantile law - issues that 
have arisen over time and that have been addressed and resolved through the 
application and the refinement of the principles, giving shape to the modern 
company. 
 
4. The techniques of the company.   
The following combined techniques constitute the device for the 
collection of public savings. 
 
a) Limited liability.  The company is liable to the extent of its assets – the 
directors are not liable for the company’s obligations and the shareholders are 
only liable to the extent of their investment. 
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b) Shares: securities and membership of the company.  The company's capital is 
divided into fungible shares of equal value.  They are negotiable and can be 
freely bought and sold. 
The company can also collect finance from the public by issuing other 
securities, such as debentures.  These securities merely represent a part of the 
financing and they are not shares in ownership.  
The share of stock represents an amount of the invested capital.  It also 
represents membership in the company in so far as it carries with it the right to 
vote.  By casting his/her vote, the shareholder participates, according to the 
majority voting system, in the decision making process of the General Meeting 
of shareholders.  The General Meeting has the fundamental powers of the 
owner of the business. 
 
c) Anonymity.  The identity of the shareholder is irrelevant, both vis à vis 
other shareholders and vìs-à-vìs the company. 
This irrelevance has developed over time also to cover the nature of 
the shareholder, which does not necessarily have to be an individual natural 
person. 
Companies, legal persons, entities, even public bodies or the state can 
all be shareholders.  The nature of the shareholder obviously affects the 
operation of the company.  However, the true nature of the company calls only 
for natural persons and this is best reflected in the model we are now 
considering, i.e. the US model. 
 
d) Stock exchange.  Shares, which represent an investment that is difficult 
to liquidate (i.e. the assets of the company), become liquid on the market.  The 
stock exchange, by creating the market for the shares and other securities, 
makes the investment liquid. 
This leads to the formation of two kinds of assets: i) the company 
assets, and ii) the share.  The value of the share depends on the company assets 
but, through the interplay of supply and demand in the stock exchange, the 
share assumes its own value, sensitive to events that may have nothing to do 
with the company assets. 
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e) Body corporate.  Legal personality is the legal formula that expresses 
succinctly the techniques of the company.  But, in its turn, legal personality is 
the technique that gives the business the organisation of the body corporate. 
Originally, the company was a combination of the following: the 
partnership contract, the body corporate, bills of exchange (shares) and the 
stock market.  The company is the partnership of the old mercantile law.  That 
is why it is a commercial contract which is granted limitation of liability 
through legal personality and with the ability to issue shares and other securities. 
The issue of securities allows access to public savings because they can be 
freely transferred on the exchanges since the identity of the holder of the 
securities is irrelevant. The irrelevance is a consequence, in legal persons, of the 
irrelevance of the identity of the partner (when a legal person is set up, the 
partner is a third party to the legal person). 
 
5. The issues arising in the collection of public savings.  
The collection of savings from the public gives rise to the problem of 
the protection of the minority shareholder. To this effect, special rules have 
developed – they are the very gist of company law and securities law.  These 
problems were in fact new and different compared to those that the old 
common commercial law addressed. 
 
a) Legal personality – institution or contract? The legal person introduces, 
through the subjectivity of the organisation, the issue of the interest of the 
company. In economic reality the interest of the company is broken down into 
the contractual interests of the members of the organisation.  The legal 
construction, on the other hand, allows an argument for finding an interest of the 
company in itself, as a separate entity, interest which at times may be in 
opposition with the interests of its members.  This contrast between the 
economic and the legal construction is also aggravated by the influence of 
tradition stemming from the old law, in which the privilege of legal personality 
was granted only for purposes of general social interest. 
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The contractual theories place the interest of the company with its 
shareholders, whereas under the institutional theories the company pursues its 
own interest and this must be respected by the shareholders.  The 
consequences of this contrast were felt in the political events between the two 
World Wars (the führerprinzip), in Italy this has also been relevant in more 
recent years.  Both in Italy and in France, social interest in the institutional 
perspective has been echoed in the law. 
On the other hand, in Anglo-American cultures the corporate interest 
question comes up with less emphasis on social characterisation (the white collar  
theories).  English law takes up the idea of the interest of the company in itself but 
this does not seem to have had any impact in practice. 
The directors are de facto agents of the shareholders, although in law 
they are agents of the company.  The majority voting procedure of the General 
Meeting creates a barrier between the interest of the individual shareholders 
and the interest of the company. The interest of the company is determined 
through the resolution of the General Meeting.  In substance, it is the 
shareholders who, under the corporate contract, define their interests through 
the General Meeting resolutions. More precisely, it is the controlling 
shareholders who determine the interest and then entrust its management to 
the directors appointed by those same controlling shareholders.  The 
controlling shareholder thus controls the interests of all other shareholders.  
The contractual balance depends on the reciprocal strength of the shareholders, 
both majority and minority. 
 
b) Vote: proxy, market for corporate control.  The vote generates the power 
to manage.  The actual exercise of the vote has costs connected to it and thus 
depends on the shareholder’s interest in voting which, in turn, depends on the 
amount of the investment.  In practice, there is a clear distinction between 
those shareholders who are interested in management and those shareholders 
who are only interested in the revenue and the liquidity of the share.  The latter 
shareholders, ‘savings shareholders’, are generally passive when it comes to 
voting and are actually said to vote by selling their shares.  Indeed, minority 
shareholders enjoy the liquidity of the market, whilst the investment of 
controlling majority shareholders cannot be easily liquidated. 
As a consequence of the passivity of the public shareholder, control 
and therefore management, can in fact be in the hands of a minority of the 
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capital, even a slight one.  The separation of management from the risks of the 
business can be emphasised by the presence of voting limitation clauses or the 
recognition of multiple voting rights. 
The minority is easy prey to proxy.  The savings shareholder, who is 
not interested in voting, does not find it difficult to transfer his/her vote.  
He/she is willing to grant proxies, without having the ability to evaluate the 
content of the vote being delegated.  Thus a situation arises in which the active 
shareholders, or the directors themselves, can easily collect proxies for the 
General Meetings in order to support their own policies and their own 
appointments.  The market for votes, proxies, becomes a common 
phenomenon depending on how much freedom is permitted by national 
legislation. This has the consequence of changing the shape of the company as 
a joint enterprise, reducing the control of General Meetings and minorities 
over the board of directors and the majority shareholders. 
The share market is also the market of votes.  For this reason it is the 
market for corporate control. Given the fiduciary relationship between 
minority shareholders and majority shareholders, any change in corporate 
control interests the minority.  The problems inherent in takeovers arise from 
this situation. 
 
b) Separation of ownership from control.  On one hand, the power to manage 
the company is concentrated in directors: they have the availability of assets 
(the company’s assets) in amounts that it would be difficult for any 
entrepreneur to have, even if joined in partnerships.  On the other hand, the 
business risks are borne by the shareholders.  This is known as the problem of 
the separation of ownership from control – management power is not coupled with 
business risks. Business risks are borne by the formal owners who are unable 
to exercise control over their agents because of the diffuse shareholdings.  The 
directors are agents without a principal. 
When some shareholders, because of the large amounts invested, 
control the majority of votes in the General Meeting, the directors find their 
principal in such shareholders to whom they account as an agent.  For this 
reason it is the majority shareholders who, through the directors, manage the 
company and therefore dispose of the interests of the minority.  It follows that 
the majority manages the assets of the minority - they are agents of the 
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minority.  Since the minority is diffuse, it does not exercise the powers of a 
principal.  Also the majority shareholder is thus an agent without a principal. 
The majority appoints the directors at the General Meeting.  It is not 
unusual for the directors to be the majority shareholders or their agents.  When 
there are no majority shareholders, because of the diffusion of the 
shareholdings, the directors end up appointing themselves by collecting 
proxies, through cross-shareholding or voting agreements, depending on the 
national legislation.  In principle directors are liable to the company and 
therefore to all shareholders, although in fact they report only to the majority 
shareholders (if there are any) with whom they consult and reach agreement.  
The directors and the majority have the financial means to support their 
appointments and any legal disputes with minority shareholders.  The directors 
have an incentive to hold back dividends to increase the business of the 
company – the payment of dividends is a cost for the company, whereas it is 
revenue for the shareholders.  The directors can disregard the minority 
shareholders’ reasons for buying shares, which concentrate on dividend 
distribution.  Their position as directors means they have access to information 
that they can use to their advantage (e.g. insider trading) and they can take 
defensive measures in their own interests in the case of takeover bids.  The 
cost of their initiatives and their defences are borne by the company. 
The interests of the majority and of the minority are opposing, like 
parties to an exchange contract.  The company is a contract with a common 
purpose between the active shareholders, whether controlling or influential, 
who act as the directors' principal. The contract becomes in fact an exchange 
contract with the minority.  This explains why the minority is often regarded as 
a debenture holder.  The public buys shares with votes only because of their 
differing price in the market for corporate control, and not to exercise the 
vote. 
Depending on the size of the company, the concentration of power 
may also have repercussions for the political organisation of the State. 
However, we are not examining this problem at this stage. 
 
d) The share markets. Share markets are anonymous in the sense that the 
dealing is impersonal and takes place between parties who do not know each 
other.  The small investor, because of the amount of his/her investment 
compared with the assets of the company and the market volume, is unable to 
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negotiate the conditions of the investment, except on a very limited scale.  
He/she can find him/herself in a trap without realising it, because of the 
difficulties and the expenses involved in the negotiation and in ascertaining the 
investment conditions.  For this reason the mechanisms of supply and demand 
work correctly if, and only if, the small investor is confident that the market 
(the issuers, the intermediaries, the advisors) is operating fairly, under 
protection regulations that experience has proven to work.  In particular, trust 
is necessary since the small investor does not have sufficient knowledge to 
evaluate the risks inherent in price formation. 
The position of the minority shareholder and of the small investor is 
similar to the position of the consumer, for whose protection consumer protection 
principles have been developed.  However, there is a significant difference 
between a small investor and a consumer.  In the relationship between the 
small investor, the company and the market, there is the intrinsic difficulty of 
understanding the investment's value because of its financial content. 
 
6. The crises have prompted the legislator to identify the solutions. 
It is worth emphasising that the problems that have arisen in the 
historical experience of crises have forced legislators to find solutions.  The 
company, like any legal institution, is a product of experience and academia 
must continually review it in order for it to remain useful. 
The English crises at the end of the XVIII century prompted the 
enactment of the first company law, The Company Act 1856.   The American 
crises of the 1930’s gave rise to the first securities laws, the Securities Act 1933 
and the Securities and Exchange Act 1934.  These laws were followed in Europe, 
in Italy as well.  Recent legal crises that emerged in the USA and in Europe 
have prompted new legislative interventions: solutions have already been 
enacted, so far mainly in the USA and France. 
Most of the problems have arisen during crises and the solutions have 
been identified through practice and by practitioners, rather than by academia.  
As we know, Adam Smith thought the company was a dangerous legal 
instrument because of the risk of abuse in the market and because of the 
political power that the size of the capital collected gave promoters.  He 
concluded that the limited company should have been restricted to activities of 
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public interest (e.g. public utilities).  The opinions of academia have slowed the 
liberalisation of the company in England and in France.  We find this reflected 
in all legal systems. 
 
6.1 The English laws of 1855-56 (Company Act).  
For the first time, the English legislation allowed the freedom to 
constitute the company by shares with limited liability, subject to three main 
conditions.2 
First of all, it set out the standard company structure in order to 
predetermine the rights and obligations of investors, because the number of 
small investors and their weak position makes it impossible for them to reach 
the same result through bargaining and negotiation.  Standardisation is the 
source of the doctrine of the individual rights of the shareholder. 
Secondly, it provided for the auditing of accounts and the publication 
of annual reports, so that the shareholder could be correctly informed on 
his/her investment, which is what gives the share its price.  The accounts are 
the basis for the disclosure regime that has developed over time. 
Lastly, it required the presence of more than one party in the business 
operation.  The plurality of shareholders makes the company a social and 
economic reality that is different from the individual businessperson and 
justifies the limitation of liability arising as a consequence of legal personality.  
The plurality rule is aimed at avoiding limited liability when the company is ‘a 
thing’ of a single shareholder.  Direct follow-up from this rule is the principle 
that those who abuse legal personality become liable (the so called ‘piercing of the 
veil’).  In other words the limitation of liability is justified by the assumption 
that the business, being a joint one, is reciprocally checked by its members.  It 
                                                   
2 “Robert Lowe, who masterminded the landmark Joint Stock Companies Act of 
1856.  If anyone deserves the title father of the modern company, it is Lowe”, “no matter 
how much modern businessmen may presume to the contrary, the company was a political 
creation.  The company was the product of a political battle, not just the automatic result of 
technological innovation.  And the debate forged in mid-nineteenth century Britain has 
shadowed the institution ever since:  Is the company essentially a private association, 
subject to the laws of the state but with no greater obligation than making money; or a 
public one which is supposed to act in the public interest? J. MIKLETHWAIT – A. 
WOOLRIDGE, The Company, cit. pp. 51,53. 
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is a principle that is implicit in company law, stemming from the shareholder 
plurality rule. A principle that has been developed by academia and through 
experience.  It is essentially a reflection of actual practice as it is probable that 
whoever deals with a company under the control of a single shareholder asks 
for guarantees to cover their exposure. 
 
6.2 The US securities legislation of the Thirties.  
The crises of the Thirties highlighted the fundamental importance of 
market quality for the protection of investments. Market quality has been 
addressed by legislators through securities regulation. This regulation 
completes the law of companies, in order to protect the small investor.  
The primary interest of the small investor in securities is the liquidity of 
the investment.  The liquidity must be real as it is a substitute for shareholder 
rights – the shareholder votes by buying or selling the shares. The small 
investor is more a shareholder in the market than in a specific company.  When 
he/she happens to exercise shareholder rights (tort liability, voting at the 
General Meeting, overturning of resolutions etc.), it generally means that the 
company’s crisis has advanced so far that the share has become illiquid. 
Market quality depends on disclosure as well as trading regulations. 
Such a regulation is aimed at price determination, prevention of price-fixing, 
monitoring of intermediaries’ behaviour (brokers, dealers, agents, investment 
funds, portfolio managers, financial advisors, financial analysts etc.), 
determination of compensation3 and in general prevention of fraud. Most of 
all, market quality depends on the prevention of conflicts of interest of 
intermediaries who, because of their role, are fiduciaries to their clients but are, 
in their day-to-day business, much closer to the issuers and thus easily 
influenced.  
Market authorities vest a pivotal role in disclosure. They also aim at 
preventing incompatibilities by separating activities where necessary and imposing 
so-called 'Chinese walls'.  The authorities’ attention has been focussed on 
                                                   
3 Arthur LEVITT, Take on the Street: What Wall Street and Corporate America 
don’t want you to know; what you can do to fight back , Pantheon Books, N.Y. The author 
was Chairman of the SEC. 
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accounting firms, financial analysts and merchant banks.  Tort liability, in 
particular in the repression of conflicts of interest, is the primary sanction.  In 
this field, US case-law has made a significant contribution. 
 
7.  The principles of the publicly held company. 
Comparing national laws, we can identify the principles that have been 
established in order to solve the problems that have arisen. National legal 
systems are articulated differently, according to the development of the public 
company.  The US law is particularly developed. 
 
a) Legal personality, instrumental for the interests of the shareholders, is a capitalist 
organisation.  The company is grounded in contract and its development can be 
traced back to contractual principles.  The corporate interest is the interest of 
the shareholders in the company contract. The contracting parties become 
shareholders and take the fundamental decisions of the owner in the General 
Meeting. They decide on the appointment and the dismissal of directors as well 
as the running or winding up of the company.  Shareholders invest in order to 
attain a profit. Such an interest is the interest of the company, entrusted to the 
fiduciary management of the directors.  The company is a profit corporation.  
 In the running of its business, the company is limited by the protection 
of other interests as well as social and political values (creditors, employees, the 
environment, local bodies etc. the so called stakeholders). These limitations are 
imposed by statutes and contracts concerning these specific interests (eg. 
employment law, trade union agreements).  They are an external limitation on 
the company in the same way as they are for the single entrepreneur. The 
company is the shareholders’ business . 
 
b) The governance of the company is the private law regulation of 
fiduciary relationships creationg individual rights and obligations and imposing a 
duty of loyalty. 
 Governance is composed by: the shareholders, beneficiaries of fiduciary 
duties, as owners; the directors, who are the fiduciaries; the market authority, 
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responsible for market quality; the court, which grants legal redress and judicial 
review.  
The law leaves it up to the shareholders to decide whether to enforce 
the rights they are granted. These rights have to be real and effective.  The 
rights are: the vote, the appointment and dismissal of directors, the pursuit of 
profit, the right to sue for damages, the sale of shares, the overturning of 
resolutions.  On one hand there are the rights of the owner who manages the 
business (pars quota).  On the other hand there are the rights of the investor to 
earn a profit (pars quanta). The small investor must be able to exercise these 
rights, notwithstanding imbalances which result from the weakness of his/her 
position. 
Fiduciary relations are regulated by private law. The protection they 
grant is effective only if the directors’ liability to the market is effective. 
Ordinary private law is not sufficient to achieve such a protection.  For this 
reason the protection depends on the 'sophistication' of both company and 
securities law.  The company is a market business as it is regulated by private 
law and thus the risk is borne by individuals.  
Company and securities regulations are based on the protection of the 
fiduciary relationship. 
The regulation of conflicts of interests is the main focus of the 
relationship.  Its implementation is entrusted to case-law, which develops 
sophisticated rules to ensure the independence of the fiduciary.  The statutory 
legislator seldom intervenes.  Courts are able to examine individual cases, each 
time confirming and adapting principles that are in the very nature of fiduciary 
protection.  In the USA, where a developed financial market exists, case-law 
successfully fulfils this task.  In Italy it is different, there is quite a lack of 
sensitivity towards this problem. 
The different market regulations can all be brought back to the 
enforcement and protection of the fiduciary relationship.  These different 
market regulations are the development of the fiduciary principle e.g. market 
price formation; disclosure; the auditing of accounts; the intermediaries’ 
conduct; the treatment of inside information; takeovers; proxy voting. 
The special market authorities are set up to reinforce the rights of who are 
beneficiaries of the fiduciary duty. 
The market authority has to make sure that available information is 
sufficient truthful in order to allow investors to make conscious decisions on 
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their dealings in shares and on any actions for their protection.  The market 
authority replaces investors’ behavior only as far as availability of information 
is concerned, not for any investment decision which remains within the 
exclusive scope of each individual private party.  Fiduciary relationships are not 
enforced by applying administrative law principles of protective supervision, as 
a substitute for private mechanisms.  The market authority does not directly 
protect the fiduciary relationship, indeed it is supposed to create the conditions 
that make it possible for the beneficiary to protect him/herself if he/she so 
wishes. 
 
c) The protection of the fiduciary relationship is effective if Court proceedings are 
effective.  The inefficiency of judicial procedures reduces the effectiveness of 
court monitoring and makes the protection of fiduciary relations worthless. 
This is much the case in Italy, where the abundant market regulation often 
remains ineffective.  The court is a fundamental component of company 
governance. 
 
d) Radical liberalism.  American authors have put forward some radical 
conceptions of market liberalisation.  It is argued that the costs borne for the 
application of regulations are not mirrored in the investors’ returns. The 
investors, according to this stream of thought, suffer the lowering of profits 
that they would have otherwise earned, without the regulations.  Regulation of 
insider trading, takeovers, disclosure, auditing etc. are all burdens that the 
market could save on.  From this viewpoint, market freedom includes the 
freedom to deceive.  The rationale is that over time and through competition, 
the 'proper' initiatives will take the place of any incorrect market operator. The 
market will select the best, with regard to correctness as well.  
This principle of market organisation has not been taken up in national 
legislations. However, it is worth recalling it since it is often confused with 
deregulation principles that are, on the other hand, better understood as 
policies for the updating of regulations.  In Italy, the administrative supervisory 
regulations should be substituted with the private regulation of the market.4. 
                                                   
4 Guido CARLI, Lacci e lacciuoli, Introduction to the Confindustria conference in 
Portofino, October 1997, published by LUISS University Press in 2002. 
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The fiduciary relationship must be legally protected – entrusting it to 
moral values and to competitive selection is never enough.  It must be 
protected through private law and not entrusted to the care of an 
administrative protective supervision.5. 
                                                   
5 Gustavo VISENTINI, Corporate Governance: The Case of Banking.  In 
Property and Corporate Governance of Banks. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly 
Review, March 1997. 
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III 
 
The Company as the legal structure for large businesses: the 
Italian experience 
 
8. The structure of the financial system shapes the company.  
The need of companies for finance through direct access to the market 
shapes company law towards the market model.  
Where business financing is mainly through banks, with minimum 
access to the stock market, the regulation of companies takes a different 
approach. In such circumstances, there is hardly any reason for governance 
mechanisms focussed upon the protection of market investors. Neither is there 
any need for the development of sophisticated financial market regulations.  
The protection of minorities is essentially assured by shareholder rights since 
such minorities are active shareholders. There is hardly any need to ensure 
investor rights, since their role is minimal.  Indeed, in this banking-oriented 
context, any such regulations (aiming at the protection of the public investor) 
would be uselessly burdensome and would end up hindering the decision 
making process. 
In such a system the regulation of companies is limited to giving shape 
to the running of businesses: the structure of the company then serves the 
purpose of composing the interests of the shareholders who are generally able 
to protect and enforce their private interests through common contract law.  
The company has the characteristics of the family business.  Even larger 
businesses can remain under the control of individual families as controlling 
shareholders.  This phenomenon is called family capitalism. 
The company remains a closed one even when the shareholders are 
banks or other financial institutions: they supply the risk capital and the 
financing that the families cannot supply and that the market is unable to 
provide.  In Italy, examples are IRI, IMI and Mediobanca.  Under these 
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conditions the actual function of the company as a legal device to shape the 
business organisation stands out even more evidently.  Therefore, it is not 
completely improper to refer to such companies as business foundations. 
The limited number of small investors does not affect corporate 
governance and it is not necessary to provide specifically for their protection.  
Indeed, the actual protection of small investors follows as a result of the 
proper functioning of the relationships between the major shareholders of the 
company, who include public bodies and banks subject to special protective 
supervision.  In large companies the proper running of the business is 
entrusted to these shareholders, their independence, their prudence and 
authority.  Good examples are the cases of IRI (when it was founded) and of 
Mediobanca because of the positive results they obtained in the reconstruction 
and development of Italian capitalism after the Second World War. 
The Italian academia and literature of the Sixties noted that IRI and 
other similar entities (such as banks specialised in industrial financing, IMI and 
Mediobanca as well) financed businesses through both risk and credit capital. 
Being at the same time shareholders and lenders, they monitored the 
management of the company entrusted to the directors.  They thus performed 
those tasks that in the United States are generally the small investors’ tasks. 
The Italian market does not have those small investors because of the 
historical conditions of our securities markets.  This is the so-called Italian 
version of the public company. 
As a matter of fact the serious crises that followed the World Wars, 
coupled with the traditional and widespread mistrust in stock investments, 
have imposed state intervention in order to favour reconstruction.  The 
conditions were thus lacking for the development of the stock market as a 
prevalent instrument for the financing of business.  Moreover, Italian tax 
legislation disfavoured the collection of savings from the public through the 
stock market, in order to avoid business risks falling directly on the unprepared 
small investor.  A policy choice was made in favour of banking and financial 
institutions: it was thought that the system, not being used to direct investment 
in industrial and commercial businesses, would not have been able to stand the 
panic inevitable crises would cause in small investors.  To protect public 
savings, preference was given to bank deposits and State guaranteed bonds.  
This is the capitalism of a mixed economy and it has characterised post-war 
Italian industrial development.  Some authors have identified the reasons for 
the scarce interest in industrial innovation in these conditions for the financing 
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and governance of large businesses - as we know, in Italy industrial innovation 
is concentrated in the many medium-sized family businesses.  The argument is 
that the prevalence of financial experiences, rather than industrial experiences, 
in the governance bodies of businesses, has actually reduced the propensity 
towards industrial risk.6 
 
9. The company as a device for the organisation of business.  
Over time, the company has come to take on differing functions. 
Instead of being the organisation of the capital invested in the business, 
the company becomes the organisation of the business itself, as a technique for 
the organisation of the business.7 
The company then becomes the sinthesis of the different interests 
involved in the running of the business. In particular, the interests of the 
employees (whether formally or in practice) or the interests of the State as a 
shareholder or of local collective bodies, depending on the nature of the 
shareholder.  The contractual nature of the company is lost, the aim of 
pursuing profits to remunerate the shareholders’ investment blurs, as 
recognised by several authors.  The stable presence of banks, subject to close 
public supervision, makes it possible for political and public directives to be 
transmitted into the largest companies.  Indirectly the State, government and 
public administration become a fundamental component of company 
governance. Protective supervision leaves recourse to civil law for the 
protection of the fiduciary relation to the very sidelines and thus so too the 
development of private market law.  It is the company of a mixed economy, 
similar and in practice interchangeable, with the state-owned economic entity. 
Using the company not as a means of access to the stock market may 
occur, without altering the nature of the company, to the extent that such use 
                                                   
6 GALLINO,  La scomparsa dell’Italia industriale, Einaudi, Torino 2003. 
7 PILLUSSEAU, La Société Anonyme, Technique d’organisation de l’entreprise, 
Sirey 1967: “La société se définirait alors comme l’ensemble des regles juridiques, des 
techniques et des mecanismes destinés a l’organisation juridiques et la vie d’une forme de 
production ou de distribution d’un organisme économique: L’entreprise”; also, my own, 
though not so recent, study on Partecipazioni pubbliche in società di diritto commune ed in 
società di diritto speciale, Milano 1979. 
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is the result of the individual will of the parties (private autonomy).  However, 
in Italy this phenomenon became physiological due to the features of the 
financial circuits.  The result is not the anomalous use of the company, but a 
new and different entity.  
This situation was necessary, as recalled above, for the financing of 
industrial reconstruction.  When, over time, this financial structure dominated 
by banking and State intermediation (very effective for the contingent 
situation) became permanent, malfunctions arose and were emphasised by the 
opening of the markets to European and international competition.   
European and global integration push companies towards the savings 
market, whose effective presence becomes a necessary condition for 
development.  But the savings market is unable to satisfy the demand for 
finance because of the shortcomings in the securities markets.  On the other 
hand its development is hindered by the lack of regulations that may confer 
greater trust to public savings.  The adoption of such regulations promotes, 
through private law, the deregulation of the mixed economy, creating the 
conditions for the mobility of capital and corporate control in competition.  A 
conservative attitude towards any alteration of the ownership structures of 
banks, finance and industry - which is the legacy of family capitalism and 
mixed economy tradition - has forced the introduction of regulations whose 
novelty turned out to be only a façade.  The anomalous development of groups 
of companies, chains of control, the so-called ‘Chinese boxes’, the so-called 
banking foundations, and the universal bank, are all examples of how the 
dominant conservative attitude preserved the status quo despite the new laws 
and regulations.   
The banking and financial sector reforms in the Nineties, responding to 
European integration, are the product of such a compromise: they use new 
formulas and slogans but the end result is the preservation of the mixed 
economy.  The pathological consequences of this attitude are before 
everyone’s eyes today8 (the recent Parmalat and Cirio scandals are significant 
examples). 
 
                                                   
8 Gustavo VISENTINI, Mixed and Market Oriented Economies: The Italian 
Situation (2000), Pallas Lectures, 1995-2000, Nijmegen 2001. 
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10.  European Integration.  
The experience of these last ten years has taught us that, in order to 
promote the creation of publicly-held companies, it is not sufficient to change 
company laws and securities laws when no change is made to the financial 
system.  It is not a matter of law – it is the system that needs to be redirected.  
The quality of the policy plan and the integrity of its implementation are of 
fundamental importance. 
It is commonplace to introduce the issue of morality into discussions 
regarding recent legal crises.  I follow with much interest and I frankly 
appreciate the calls for business ethics that philosophers, economists and 
politicians address to market operators.  As jurists we know that for the 
interpreter, for the judge, the ethical criteria stem from the law, that we must 
respect, grasping the essence of its policy motivations: this criteria must be 
followed when applying the law to real life cases.  For the interpreter, ethics 
derive from the correct application of the spirit of the law, supporting the 
morals of the legislation and avoiding elusive interpretations.  Business ethics is 
the primary task of the legislator, whose role is to give us a moral law.  The law 
is not supposed to betray the moral aims put forward by policy makers.  
Indeed, I found that this betrayal took place in the compromise reached in the 
recent Italian legislation on companies and securities markets. 
The competition between market financing and banks is an issue for 
European integration.  Its solution will affect the development of securities 
markets and the law regulating businesses, from company law to bankruptcy 
law.  These are certainly not domestic issues, they have become a key 
European preoccupation. 
 
 
